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Abstract
This paper responds to the development policy debate involving the World Bank and the
IMF on the use of fiscal policy not only for economic stabilization but also to promote eco-
nomic growth and increase per capita income. A key issue in this debate relates to the effect
of the composition of public expenditure on economic growth. Policy makers and some
researchers have argued that expenditure on growth-enhancing functions could enhance
future revenue and justify the provision of "fiscal space" in the budget. But there are no
simple ways to identify the growth-maximizing composition of public expenditure. The cur-
rent paper lays out a research strategy to explore the effects of fiscal policy, including the
composition of public expenditure, on economic growth, using a time series approach. 
Based on the modeling strategy of Greiner, Semmler and Gong (2005) we develop a general
model that features a government that undertakes public expenditure on (a) education
and health facilities which enhance human capital, (b) public infrastructure such as roads
and bridges necessary for market activity, (c) public administration to support government
functions, (d) transfers and public consumption facilities, and (e) debt service. The pro-
posed model is numerically solved, calibrated and the impact of the composition of public
expenditure on the long-run per capita income explored for low-, lower-middle- and upper-
middle-income countries. Policy implications and practical policy rules are spelled out, the
extension to an estimable model indicated, a debt sustainability test proposed, and the
out-of-steady-state dynamics studied.
Keywords: Infrastructure investment, Economic growth, Compostion of the public
budget, Financing public expenditures, Public deficit, Public debt.
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 1. Introduction
Starting from a “production function” view of the growth and development process
with a narrow focus on physical capital, labor force, and exogenous technical progress,
growth theory has come to acknowledge the role of an economy’s endowment and con-
tinuing investment in human capital, physical infrastructure, research and knowledge
development, institutions, and innovation in explaining its growth trajectory.
The implications for policy design are somewhat harder to divine. From the perspec-
tive of a government, which policies enhance an economy’s growth prospects and
how large are policy effects on growth? In part, the answer depends on the empirical
approach taken. Studies based on cross-country regressions have explored a large
number of forces of growth, but they face methodological perils such as the huge het-
erogeneity of countries (different technologies, institutions, and preferences across
countries), and the uncertainty of presumed underlying models and parameters. Con-
sequently, nonrobustness of the outcomes and ambiguous policy implications are a
common criticism of studies based on cross-country regressions1.
Greiner, Semmler and Gong (2005) argue that a time series perspective on economic
growth may be more useful to pursue in designing growth and development strategies.
Growth models, as advocated by Greiner and colleagues, (1) allow for better specifi-
cation of microeconomic behavior of economic agents, (2) enable time series study
of the forces of growth for a country or a group of countries at particular stages of
economic growth, (3) permit analysis using econometric time series methods, and
(4) allow us to spell out (though mostly in the context of small-scale models) impor-
tant implications for growth and development policies.
Since such models, which lend themselves to some time series tests, are often difficult
to treat when a larger number of forces of growth are introduced, Greiner et al. (2005)
have suggested identifying the specific forces that are important in a particular coun-
try consistent with its particular stage of development. They mainly consider exter-
nalities and learning from others, education and human capital, the creation and
accumulation of knowledge and public infrastructure as forces of economic growth
in a time series context. Overall, this approach allows analysts to better derive the
public policy implications for economic growth.
The primary interest of this paper is to explore, as the World Bank’s papers to the De-
velopment Committee (2006, 2007) suggest, whether countries could better use fiscal
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1 See Rodrik (2005) for a methodological criticism of cross-country regressions in identifying growth effects of policies. See also Easterly
(2005) in the Handbook of Economic Growth for a skeptical review of the role of policies in explaining cross-country growth.
policy (and in particular, the level and composition of public expenditure) to promote
sustainable increases in growth and welfare for low- and middle-income countries. We
are encouraged by some recent work by Glomm and Rioja (2006), Agenor and Neanidis
(2006), and country studies undertaken by World Bank research2. 
Section 2 provides a selective discussion of recent literature and empirical evidence
on public investment in infrastructure, health, and education and their effect on
growth. In section 3 we sketch a general social planner type model that includes
choices regarding the accumulation of physical capital as well as the composition of
investment in infrastructure, health, and education. In section 4, the model is cali-
brated by matching actual differences in per capita income for three groups of coun-
tries (for low-income, lower-middle-income and upper-middle-income countries). In
addition the effects of a change in foreign aid and other factors that have an impact
on growth are explored. 
Section 5 undertakes a similar calibration exercise; here, however, by considering the
growth and welfare effects arising from a change in the composition of the public ex-
penditure. Section 6 discusses sustainability tests of fiscal policy. Section 7 concludes
the paper and spells out some practical policy rules. In the appendix the data sources
are discussed and the detailed results for the lower-middle-income and upper-mid-
dle-income countries are reported. Also, in the appendix the out-of-steady-state dy-
namics of a simplified version of the model are explored, and it is shown how that
the model can be turned into an estimable model using time series data.
 2. Literature and Evidence
The scope for policy to influence economic growth depends on the underlying model
of growth. So long as the Solow model dominated economists’ view of growth, there
was little role for fiscal policy to influence the long term rate of growth, which de-
pended on exogenous technical progress3. Lucas (1988) and Barro (1990) opened
the door to a rich literature on endogenous growth theory and a corresponding at-
tempt to develop our understanding of the implications for fiscal policy. Tanzi and
Zee (1997) provide a relatively early review of the resulting literature on fiscal policy
and concluded that despite the lack of robust empirical results, endogenous growth
theory provided the basis for confidence that fiscal policy could affect long run growth
performance of countries.
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2. See the papers by Arestoff and Hurlin (2006), Balonos (2005), Ferreira and Arajo (2006), and Suescun (2005).
3. Temple (2003) argues that the scope for policy to have an influence on the level of output should merit the attention of policy
makers and analysts but has been neglected because of a misguided focus on effects on the long term growth rate and an
undervaluation of level effects.
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The theoretical literature on fiscal policy has studied the effect of ‘productive’ and
‘unproductive’ spending and distortionary and non-distortionary taxation on long
term growth. This literature generally predicts that productive spending financed by
non-distortionary taxes will have a positive effect on long term growth whereas the
opposite combination (unproductive spending financed by distortionary taxation)
will have a negative effect. The algebraic sign of other spend-tax combinations is more
ambiguous since there are opposing effects at work. Barro (1990) suggests that an
inverted U-curve relationship would exist between productive government expenditure
and economic growth, as the rising cost of distortionary taxation necessary to finance
spending overtakes the declining benefits of productive spending.
Early models of growth that featured government expenditure used fairly simple char-
acterizations of productive and unproductive spending-public investment was viewed
to be productive whereas public consumption was unproductive. Devarajan et al.
(1996) developed a model with public investment and consumption expenditure to
show that the growth impact of public investment could be negative if there was ex-
cessive investment. Glomm and Ravikumar (1997) considered the implications of
government expenditure on infrastructure (which influences private production) as
well as on education which results in human capital accumulation. More recent lit-
erature (Zagler and Durnecker, 2003, Glomm and Rioja, 2006, Blankenau and Simp-
son, 2004, Agenor and Neanidis, 2006) provide a more disaggregated discussion of
government expenditure, typically including spending on public infrastructure, health,
and education, which are described as providing inputs for private production. Zagler
and Durnecker (2003) define an economy where output is produced using labor, pri-
vate capital and public infrastructure expenditure and consider the effects of govern-
ment spending and taxation on long term growth rates. Glomm and Rioja (2006)
consider the implications of shifting expenditure from transfers to infrastructure for
education and conclude, based on empirical evidence from Brazil, that at the margin
the growth implications are small. Blankenau and Simpson (2004) focus on education
expenditure and growth.
Some of the papers take account of the interdependence among these expenditures,
with the productivity of health spending depending on education and infrastructure
expenditure or stocks, and vice versa. The intuition behind such complementarities is
well known - good sanitation and water supply infrastructure has large health benefits,
including a reduction in incidence of malaria and gastro-intestinal diseases. This in
turn has a positive effect on school attendance rates and on learning outcomes (see
Bundy and et al., 2005) as well as on labor productivity in market activities.
While theoretical models have become more nuanced about public expenditure and
their financing, the empirical evidence is often perceived to be ambiguous, reflecting
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problems of data, differing research methodologies and econometric techniques.
Gemmell (2007) provides a useful review of the evidence, and concludes that more
recent literature uses more reliable methods (including a clearer specification of the
government budget constraint) to derive robust evidence, at least for OECD countries,
of long run impacts of fiscal policy on economic growth. Even for developing countries
he finds that, consistent with theory, recent studies show a positive medium to long-
run growth effect of certain categories of expenditure, such as transport and com-
munication infrastructure, education and health. However, the complementarities
between health, education, infrastructure and growth involve trade-offs in the actual
development process. Public resources are limited and given the constraints govern-
ments often need to weigh the benefits of expenditure on one against the benefits of
spending on the other. In the following section a model is formulated to represent
both the complementarities and the trade-offs of public investment.
 3.  A Model of Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth
The model to be presented is based on the work by Greiner et al. (2005) but takes into
account some of the generalizations that have been put forward by Corsetti and Roubini
(1996) and others. The current paper develops a model of growth with a private and a
public sector, the latter described by a government that can choose to raise resources
through taxation, borrowing, or foreign aid. In our model we assume that the tax rate
is chosen optimally and there is a well-defined inter-temporal budget constraint. We
allow for foreign debt and spell out fiscal policy rules that ensure sustainability of debt.
Besides the accumulation of physical capital by the private sector, the model includes
public investment in infrastructure, health and education. In contrast to Agenor and
Yilmaz (2006) who work with expenditure flows, we develop a model with stocks: private
physical capital, human capital and a broad notion of public capital that includes public
infrastructure to support market production as well as facilities for health and education
services. The paper attempts to derive some policy insights using empirical techniques
to estimate the model. Given that time series models that study forces of growth in a
historical context are rather complex and require high quality time series data to be es-
timated, we adopt a calibration technique to assess the growth impact of fiscal policy
on countries identified by levels of income/development.
3.1 The Model
The Economy
Production in this stylized economy is characterized by a Cobb Douglas function 
(Akα (u1h)β (v1g)γ for the production of market goods and ((1–u1)h)ε1 (v2 g)ε2 (v3g)ε3
for the production of human capital) with private capital k, public capital g, andfis
ca
l P
o
lic
y, 
Pu
bl
ic
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
 c
o
m
po
si
ti
o
n 
an
d 
G
ro
w
th
. s
em
m
le
r, 
W
. ,
 G
re
in
er
, a
., 
D
ia
llo
, b
., 
r
aj
ar
am
, a
. a
nd
 r
ez
ai
, a
. 
52
 
  
A E S T I M AT I O
  
human capital h. Note that only a part of public capital (v1g) is used to support pri-
vate market production, while other parts are used to help to build human capital in
the form of schools (v2g) and medical centers (v3g) and do not directly influence pro-
duction4. This realistically describes the longer gestation lag in creating human capital
relative to typical physical infrastructure.
The Government
Government (represented by a social planner) raises taxes optimally without distor-
tion and can choose four types of public expenditure: (i) public investment to enhance
education and health services that increase the stock of human capital, (ii) investment
on public infrastructure assets (transport and communication system as well as en-
ergy, water supply and sanitation), to support market production and the creation
of human capital, (iii) transfers and public consumption representing expenditure
with public goods' characteristics which may enter into households' preferences (pub-
lic parks, civic facilities and consumption transfers), and (iv) public administration
necessary for the functioning of the government (including justice, security and tax
collection). These four expenditure streams allow us to consider the effect of public
expenditure composition on growth.
The stylized model developed in this paper focuses on deriving the implications for
growth and welfare due to alternative government choices regarding the allocation
of the stock and flow of public capital. The government can choose to allocate public
investment in infrastructure assets (such as roads) that directly influence market pro-
duction or in assets relevant for human capital accumulation (such as schools and
clinics) that may have a lagged effect on growth. The growth and welfare effects are
worth studying since they help us highlight the inter-temporal consequences and
trade-offs of policy choices confronting many governments5. 
The model enables government to acquire foreign debt and recognizes debt service as
a part of the government budget. Foreign transfers to low-income countries are assumed
to reflect foreign aid that is earmarked for public investment. The social planner is as-
sumed to maximize a logarithmic welfare function, a form that simplifies preferences.
When we define the variables, all variables are in per capita form and we define public
capital as non-excludable but subject to congestion in the production of market
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4.  Since the v’s represent shares, v1+ v2 +v3 = 1. 
5.  To focus on the effects of public capital allocation, the model assumes a stylized world where the government decides on the
allocation of public capital and the private sector provides the labor to staff the schools and clinics as well as the labor employed in
market production. One could imagine an economy where private sector volunteers provide the human capital services but rely on
complementary government facilities. Human capital allocation therefore has no direct impact on the government budget.  An
extension to the current paper could consider the implication of government employment of teachers and doctors and then consider
the compositional choice regarding capital and recurrent wage expenditure.
goods and the creation of human capital, because it is per capita public capital 
(g = G/L) which affects per capita output.
 Table 1. Variable Overview (all in per capita terms)
Variables Description
b Debt
c Consumption
d Debt service
ep Amount of resources absorbed by the public sector
k Private capital
g Public capital
h Human capital
y GDP
 Table 2. Parameter Overview (all in per capita terms)
Parameters Description
A Productivity factor
i fp Foreign aid
n Population growth rate
r Borrowing rate
u1 Fraction of h used to support the production of k
1–u1 Fraction of h used to build new h
v1 Fraction of g used to support the production of k
v2 Fraction of g used to build new h in the form of schools
v3 Fraction of g used to build new h in the form of medical centers
α1 Share of public resources used for the building of new g
α2 Share of public resources used for transfers and public consumption
α3 Share of public resources used for the functioning of the administration
α4 Share of public resources used for debt services
α Elasticity of GDP w.r.t. k
β Elasticity of GDP w.r.t. h
γ Elasticity of GDP w.r.t. g
dk Depreciation of private capital ( k )
dg Depreciation of public capital ( g )
dh Depreciation of human capital ( h )
ε1 Elasticity of h w.r.t. existing h
ε2 Elasticity of h w.r.t. g in the form of schools
ε3 Elasticity of h w.r.t. g in the form of medical centers
h Weight of transfers and public consumption in utility
r Discount rate
U Utility/welfare
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The amount of resources absorbed by the public sector, ep, is used for public infra-
structure (ip =α1 ep), transfers and public consumption (cp =α2 ep), and public admin-
istration (tr =α3 ep). The latter has neither utility nor productive effects, but possesses
public goods features and is necessary for the functioning of the state. Finally, for the
debt service we have d =(1–α1–α2–α3)ep=α4ep 6.
When public investment is turned into public capital, we can think of three uses of
the public capital: First, there exists public capital which raises productivity of market
production, such as transport systems (roads, bridges, harbors) and utilities (for ex-
ample water supply). In the model, that part is v1g. The other fraction of public capital
is used for facilitating the formation of human capital via health services, v2 g, and
education, v3 g. In our view, the formulation with one public capital stock, which is
divided (and subdivided) between use in production and human capital formation,
is sufficient to study the composition effect of public expenditure.
Note that for the government budget constraint we can write G=i fp +(α1+α2+α3+α4)ep ,
with i fp +α1ep earmarked for public investment and α4ep for debt service. In the steady
state then we have i fp +α1ep =(dg+n)g. The flow of expenditure should be properly sub-
divided in spending for infrastructure, health, and education, according to the frac-
tions v1, v2 and v3
7. Moreover, note that the government revenue is also T=i fp +ep , but
what can be used for domestic spending is only T–α4ep , since α4ep flows out for debt
service. The primary surplus of the government budget is α4ep .
We presume a planner solves the system of equations below to derive the social 
optimum:
max ∫∞0 e–(r–n)t ( –1)dt (1) 
subject to
•k =Akα (u1h)β (v1g1)
γ –c –ep –(dk +n)k (2) 
•h=((1–u1)h)ε1 (v2g)
ε2 (v3 g)
ε3 –dhh (3) 
•g =i fp+α1ep –(dg +n)g (4) 
•b= (r –n)b –(1–α1–α2–α3)ep (5) 
Note that for simplicity we assume an additively separable utility function 
U (•) = ln c +h ln(α2ep). Note also that equations (2) - (5) describe the constraints to
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6. Note that we can allow for net borrowing. If we define net borrowing as i bp , earmarked for public investment, we will, then, 
have to add i bp in equations (4) and (5) as additional borrowing. We can think of i fp in equation (4) as representing both foreign aid
and net borrowing. In the steady state debt, b, and the debt-to-income ratio, b/y , will correspondingly fall, since the maximal
sustainable debt level will decrease as more debt is taken on. 
7. We might think that the annual revenue, earmarked for i fp +α1ep , is handed over to a trust fund that manages the public current
and capital expenditure related to infrastructure, health and education. 
(c(α2ep)h)1–σ
1–σc,ep ,u1
the growth of private capital, human capital, public capital and debt. Since we only
consider an exogenous growth model in this version, α +β +γ ≤1, e.g. α = β =γ = 0.33.
One could introduce here some externalities, as in Greiner et al. (2005, ch.3), to ob-
tain endogenous growth.
In a further extension we could allow for foreign borrowing (for public investment)
by adding a positive term to equations (4) and (5). Since this borrowing will be con-
stant and permanent, the level of permissible debt level will fall. However, since in-
come will increase, the debt-to-income ratio b/y will also fall. This is exactly what we
expect from a numerical exercise8.
Our formulation of public debt implies that public debt is foreign public debt. New
borrowing from abroad can be allowed for9. Interest payments on existent foreign
debt (for example foreign bonds) is rb (at world interest rate). Repayments and in-
terest payments do not go to the domestic household sector, but go to foreigners.
The usual transversality condition is assumed to hold (see section 3.2).
Next we explore the stationary state of the model in its form of equations (1) - (5).
We employ the Hamiltonian to sketch a solution of the model. The Hamiltonian is
H (c , e , k , h , g) = ln c+hln(α2ep)
+ λ1 [Akα(u1h)β (v1g)γ –c –ep –(dk +n)k]
+ λ2 [((1–u1)h)β1 (v2g)β2 (v3g)β3 –(dkh] (6)
+ λ3 [i fp +α1ep –(dg +n)g]
+ λ4 [(r –n)b –(1–α1–α2–α3)ep]
with λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4 the co-state variables. The first order conditions for the two choice
variables, c and ep , are:
= 0 ⇒ c−1 =λ1 (7)
= 0 ⇒ he−1p =λ1–λ3α1–λ4(1–α1–α2–α3) (8)
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∂H
∂c
∂H
∂ep
8 Note that this term does not have to be constant. It suffices if the term is positive on average for the results to hold.
9 See footnote 3.
For the co-state variables we have
λ1= λ1(r –n)– =λ1(r –n)–λ1 [Aαkα1 (u,h)β (v1g)γ–(dk +n)] (9)
λ2= λ2(r –n)– =λ2(r –n)   – λ1[Akαβ(u,h)β-1u1(v1g)γ]
(10)
– λ2[ε1((1–u1)h)ε1–1(1–u1)((1–v1)g)ε2 –dh]
λ3= λ3(r –n)– =λ3(r –n)   – λ1[Akα (u1h)β γ (v1g)γ-1u1• v1]
(11)
– λ2[((1–u1)h)ε1((1–v1)g)ε2–1ε2(1–v1)]+λ3(dg+n)
λ4= λ4(r –n)– =λ4(r –n)   – λ4(r –n) (12) 
Equations (7)-(12), which are derived from the two first order conditions with respect
to the choice variables c and ep and the four equations for the co-state variables λ1, λ2,
λ3, and λ4, give us, together with the four state variable equations (2)-(5), a system of
ten equations in ten variables {c, e, k, h, g, b, λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4}. Writing eqns. (7) and (8) as
0 = λ1−c−1 (13)
0 = λ1−λα1−he−1p −λ4(1–α1–α2–α3) (14)
and setting the differential equations (2)-(5) as well as (9)-(12) equal to zero, we can
obtain a stationary state {c*, e*, k*, h*, g*, b*, λ*1, λ*2, λ*3, λ*4}. Plugging these into the
production function y= Akα(u1h)β (v1g)
γ, we can also obtain the per capita income, y*,
at the stationary state.
Given our specification of human capital and its use, we can study the effect of the
allocation of human capital on per capita income and the other macroeconomic vari-
ables. Furthermore, varying our parameter set v1, v2 and v3, we can explore the impact
of different public expenditure compositions on the steady-state outcomes of per
capita income and the other variables. A further effect on per capita income is pre-
dicted to be caused by a change of the parameter A and of foreign aid, i fp >0. Overall,
from all of those comparative static studies we expect to obtain information on per
capita income, consumption and the other macro variables.
Specifying all parameters, the following numerical stationary solution is obtained from
necessary optimality conditions using the computer software Mathematica10 11 12:
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∂H
∂k
∂H
∂h
∂H
∂h
∂H
∂b
10 The parameter values used are: n = 0.015 , r = 0.03 , dk = 0.075 , dh = 0.075 , dg = 0.05 , α = β = γ = 0.33 , u1 = 0.85 , 
v1 = 0.8 , v2 = 0.1, v3 = 0.1 , ε1 = ε2 = 0.2 , ε3 = 0.25 , α1 = 0.1, α2 = 0.7 , α3 = 0.1 , i fp = 0.05 , A = 1, h = 0.1, r = 0.07.
11 The mathematica code is available at www.newschool.edu/gf/cem.
12 Note that these values are dimensionless and are calibrated in such a way as to fit the data. Economic implications are derived 
in later sections, where the effects of comparative changes are explored.
.
.
.
.
k*= 86.59, h*= 21.97 , g*=17.86 , b*= 20.20, y*= 27.55,  b*   y = 0.73
With this solution technique we can undertake the above described comparative static
analyses and some important calibrations, see sects. 4 and 513.
3.2 Fiscal Policy to Ensure Debt Sustainability14
The model of section 3.1 permits government to borrow from capital markets, in par-
ticular to borrow from abroad in order to undertake public investment. In this section,
we want to explore the effects and implications of government borrowing from capital
markets and briefly discuss the sustainability of fiscal policy when borrowing is al-
lowed for15 16. 
Let us assume that the government has borrowed from abroad for undertaking public
investment. The implication of this type of expenditure is that along the transition
path, this will raise the growth rate of public infrastructure and lead to a higher level
of public capital. This higher level brings a distortion into the model by raising the
marginal product of private capital. As a consequence, the investment share is in-
creased and the growth rate of consumption rises implying higher welfare after a suf-
ficiently long adjustment period. Note that this also leads to higher growth of physical
and human capital. However, in our growth model these growth effects only hold on
the transition path. In the long-run, higher public investment leads to higher levels of
output and consumption but does not affect the growth rate of endogenous variables. 
Since here borrowing from abroad equals loans or issuing of bonds to foreigners, the
government must pay it back plus interest payments. Debt repayment is represented
by α4ep. More concretely, the government has to stick to the inter-temporal budget
constraint which can be written as
b(0)=∫∞0 e s(τ)dτ↔ lim e b(t)=0 (15)
where s denotes the primary surplus which, in our model, is given by α4ep. The first
term in (15) states that per-capita government debt at time zero must equal the dis-
counted stream of future primary surpluses. This implies that the government must
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–∫τ0 (r(μ)–n)dμ –∫
t
0 (r(τ )–n)dτ
t→∞
13 Allowing for additional borrowing by adding a constant in eqns. (4) and (5) and setting this borrowing at the same size as 
foreign aid, i bp = 0.05 , we obtain the following numerical values:  k*= 88.67, h*= 22.36, g* = 18.43 , y*= 28.21, b/y*= 0.67. 
As one can observe, b and b/y fall, indicating a fall in permissible debt. 
14  Since this section treats empirical matters, its notation is changed in order to comply with readily available data 
(e.g. G now refers to primary expenditure and not public capital as in the rest of the paper).
15  Again, note that in case of net borrowing a constant needs to be added to equation (5) and the foreign aid parameter i fp in 
equation (4) is supposed to be corrected for the availability of new investment funds for public capital.
16  In Greiner et al. (2005), ch. 6, more particular model versions are developed with government borrowing for specific government 
expenditures.
run primary surpluses, if it starts with a positive stock of debt. Equivalent to this for-
mulation is the requirement that discounted debt converges to zero asymptotically.
It should be mentioned that in theoretical exogenous growth models the inter-tem-
poral budget constraint is met, provided the interest rate exceeds the population
growth rate on average, because per-capita debt converges to a finite value. Never-
theless, it is important for real world economies to check for rules whether fiscal poli-
cies of countries are such that they fulfill the inter-temporal budget constraint or not. 
One possible rule for sustainability is to require that the government adjusts the pri-
mary surplus to GDP ratio to variations in the debt-GDP ratio. To see that a positive
linear dependence of the primary surplus ratio17 on the debt ratio can guarantee sus-
tainability, we assume that the primary surplus ratio is given by
=α +β(t)          (16)
with y(t ) per-capita GDP. β(t ) determines how strongly the primary surplus to GDP
ratio reacts to changes in the public debt-GDP ratio and α, which is assumed to be
constant, can be interpreted as a systematic component determining how the level of
the primary surplus reacts to a rise in GDP. α can also be seen as representing other
constant variables which affect the primary surplus to GDP ratio.
Using equation (16), the differential equation describing the evolution of public debt
can be rewritten as 
b(t ) = (r(t)−n)b(t)−s(t)=(r(t)−n −β (t))b(t)−α y(t). (17)
Solving this differential equation and multiplying both sides by e to
get the present value of public debt yields
e                      b(t)=e                (b(0)–α y(0)∫ t0 dτ), (18)
with γ the growth rate of GDP. Equation (18) shows that a positive value for β on
average, so that converges to plus infinity asymptotically, is necessary for
sustainability. It is also sufficient, if r(μ) −n −γ (μ) is positive on average18.
It should be noted that a positive value for r −n −γ characterizes a dynamically efficient
deterministic economy. If the economy is stochastic, however, this need not necessarily
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s(t)
y(t)
b(t)
y(t)
–∫ t0 (r(τ )–n)dτ
-∫ t0 (r(τ )–n)dτ -∫
t
0 β(τ )dτ
-∫ t0 β(τ )dτ
∫ t0 β(τ )dτ
∫τ0 (β(μ)–r(μ)+n+γ(μ))dμ
17 Note in the subsequent part we solely focus on the sustainability issue and ignore the feedback effects of a changing surplus on
the other spending categories.
18 This holds because l'Hôpital gives the limit of the second term in (18) multiplied by e as e                            /β-∫
t
0 (r(μ)–n–γ(μ))dμ
.
hold for the economy to be dynamically efficient. Nevertheless, testing the reaction
of the primary surplus to variations in the debt ratio is reasonable because a positive
reaction is necessary for sustainability as mentioned above. Further, this test yields
insight as to how governments deal with public debt and, thus, shows how important
the goal of stabilizing debt is for the government. 
One advantage of the sustainability test just presented is to be seen in the fact that it
does not depend on the interest rate, in contrast to other tests where the assumed
interest rate may be crucial as to the outcome whether a given policy is sustainable
or not. In addition, the proposed rule is intuitively plausible from an economic point
of view. If a government runs a deficit, it has to run a primary surplus in the future to
pay back the deficit. Otherwise, sustainability is not given. In our model economy,
this implies a withdrawal of resources from the economy. Therefore, a deficit financed
increase in public investment is beneficial for the economy, if the gain in productivity
is sufficiently high to cover the interest payments and the loan. A detailed discussion
of different types of sustainability tests and how the above suggested sustainability
rule can be implemented is undertaken in section 6 of the paper. Next we explore the
change of the basic structure of the model and its impact on the macroeconomic
variables such as output, consumption, capital stock and debt.
 4. Exploring the Basic Structure of the Model
We want to explore the effect of foreign aid, i fp , the productivity factor, A, and the
fraction of human capital used in market goods production, u1, on the steady-state
variables of three group of countries classified by income level. We follow the World
Bank's 2006 paper to the Development Committee in classifying countries in low-in-
come, lower-middle-income, and upper-middle-income groups. Due to the quality of
the data, however, only a reduced list of countries is used for the calibration exercise19.
We employ only data for the time period 1994 to 2004. First, we will calibrate the ef-
fect of foreign aid, i fp 20. By looking at actual data of foreign aid per capita, we are
able to determine a range in which our parameters can vary. Before we can evaluate
the effect of foreign aid, productivity factor, and the fraction of human capital used
in market goods production on per capita income, we need to calibrate our above-
mentioned model (1) to (5) such that we can roughly reproduce the differences in
per capita income across the three groups of countries. Since, as discussed above,
there are many forces of growth causing the differences in per capita income, we ad-
just the productivity level of the three groups, the parameter A, such that we roughly
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19 See Appendix A.4 for the complete list of countries.
20 Note that in the following we presume that there is no new borrowing, so that i fp is solely foreign aid.
obtain the actual differences in per capita income, normalizing the parameter, A, of
the lowest per capita income group. Therefore A is set to 1 for the lowest income
group. We hereby take the composition of total public expenditure, α1, α2, α3, 
and α4, as given for each group as we find them in the data. Now we employ our
Mathematica program to obtain stationary state solutions for the three groups of coun-
tries21. This is equivalent to a comparative static analysis for the three country groups.
Our exercise consists in keeping the parameter, A, constant for each group of countries
and equal to its calibrated value. Then we let foreign aid, i fp , vary during that period
and see how such a change affects the steady-state values k, h, g, c, ep , y , b/y and U.
Such an exercise was conducted for the low-, lower-middle-, and upper-middle income
groups. In the next step we vary the productivity parameter, A, for each group of coun-
tries, employing for each country group the A that we used to calibrate the model to
obtain the actual differences in per capita income, and increasing it gradually. The
parameter, A, is set equal to 1, 1.18, and 1.45 for the low-, lower-middle-, and upper-
middle income groups respectively. Finally, we vary u1, the fraction of human capital
used in market goods production, from 0.1 to 0.8, keeping foreign aid equal to its
10-year average, and the other parameters constant.
4.1 Effects of Foreign Aid per Capita, i fp 
The comparative static results for all income groups show that k, h, g, c, ep , y, b/y , and
U are linear in i fp and there is clearly a positive relationship between the level of foreign
aid and all the variables, except for public resources per capita, ep , and debt per GDP,
b/y, which show a negative relationship with respect to foreign aid, i fp 22. As the foreign
aid goes up the public resources per capita falls slightly. The results suggest that any
increase in foreign aid per capita would increase k, h, g, c and y but would reduce only
very slightly the optimally chosen public resources, ep . Such a negative relationship
could be explained by the fact that public resource is a result of a lump-sum taxation
and as more aid flows in, there is less and less incentive to tax, and as a result, a de-
crease in public resources, ep . A similar argument can be made for debt per GDP, b/y.
As more aid flows in, there is less and less incentive to borrow, and as a result, there
would be a fall in b/y as i fp increases. Actual data for the period 1994-2004 shows
that the per capita foreign aid went from 2 to 4. To conduct our comparative static
exercises, we increased i fp by increments of 0.2 from 2 to 4, which is the range provided
by the actual data23.The results of our comparative static exercises for the low-income
group are summarized in Table 4 in appendix A.5. The results for the remaining two
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21 The mathematica code is available at www.newschool.edu/gf/cem.
22 This paper does not address the problems of moral hazard and inefficiency that often characterize aid inflows into poor governance 
environments. Waste, corruption, and inefficiency would clearly weaken the effects of foreign aid on growth and welfare.
23 Recent literature has studied the effect of foreign aid on per capita income in country by country studies (see Easterly (2006)) or  
in cross-section studies (see Reddy and Minoiu (2006)). The latter study finds significant and large effects.
income groups can also be found in the appendix A.5. Figure 1 below shows the re-
lationship between i fp and y, U, b/y, and ep respectively for the low-income group. Sim-
ilar results are observed for the lower-middle and upper-middle income groups24.
 Figure 1. Effects of Foreign Aid, i fp , on the Steady State Variables 
(Low-Income Group)
4.2. Effect of A, the productivity factor
The comparative static results for all income groups show that k, h, g, c, ep , y, b/y and
U are linear in A and there is clearly a positive relationship between the level of foreign
aid and all the variables. The results suggest that any increase in A would increase k,
h, g, c, ep , y, b/y and U. Because the low-income group is our reference group, A is in-
creased from 1 to 1.06, and the effect on the steady-state variables is observed. As
one might predict, results show that there is a positive linear relationship between A
and all the steady-state values of the variables, with the fastest increase in k, y and g,
relative to the other variables. The results of our comparative static exercises for the
low-income group are summarized in Table 5 in appendix A.5. The results for the other
two income groups can also be found in the appendix. Figure 2 below shows the rela-
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24 Note that the effect of an increase of A has rather large effects on output. But also note that an increase of our A by 6% would 
correspond to an increase in the efficiency of labor by roughly 20%, since we have written A as outside the production function, 
namely as exogenous technical change affecting total factor productivity.
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U
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i fp 
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y
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tionship between A and y, and k respectively for the low-income group. Similar results
are observed for the lower-middle and upper-middle income groups.
 Figure 2. Effects of the Productivity Factor A on the Steady State Variables 
(Low-Income Group)
4.3 Effects of the Fraction of Human Capital Used in 
Market Goods Production, u1
To analyze the effect of the parameter u1, it was increased from 0.05 to 0.95 with
increments of 0.05, and the steady-state values corresponding to the different val-
ues of the parameter were recorded. The comparative static results on u1 for all
income groups show a hump-shape, non-linear relationship, with respect to k, h,
g, c, ep , y, b/y and U. With respect to the hump-shape relationship, we can make
the following observations: First, we observe a positive relationship between u1
and  k, h, g, c, ep , y, b/y and U for u1≤ 0.8, and a negative relationship for u1≥ 0.8.
We observe increasing returns for  k, h, g, c, ep , y, b/y, when u1≤ 0.3 and decreasing
returns when u1≥ 0.3. As for U, and b/y, we always observe decreasing returns for
all values of u1. Second, as to human capital, h, we observe a positive relationship
between 1–u1 and h when 1–u1≤ 0.3, and a negative relationship for 1–u1≥ 0.3. Fi-
nally, it was observed in our exercises that the nature, and form of the hump-shape
relationship depend on the choice of our parameters. For instance, we chose ε1,
ε2, and ε3 to sum up to less than 1, indicating decreasing returns. When the above
parameters are chosen such that they sum up to more than 1, both the nature of
the relationship and the optimal point for u1 change. The results of our compara-
tive static exercise for the low-income group are summarized in Table 6 in appen-
dix. The results for the other two income groups can also be found in the appendix
A.5. Figure 3 above shows the relationship between u1 and y, U, h, and b/y, and
between 1–u1 and h, for the low-income group. Similar results are observed for
the lower-middle and upper-middle income groups.
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EFFECT OF A ON k (Low Income Group) EFFECT OF A ON y (Low Income Group)
 Figure 3. Effect of the Fraction of Human Capital Used in Market Goods 
Production, u1, on the Steady State Variables (Low-Income Group)
The observation that u1 , has a non-linear, hump-shaped relationship with all the vari-
ables suggests a decreasing return effect so that, beyond a point, any increase in the
fraction of resources allocated to one area takes away resources from other areas that
may indeed contribute more to growth. Furthermore, the hump-shaped form of the
effect of 1–u1 on per capita human capital, h, implies that any increase in the param-
eters would first increase h, but beyond the 30% threshold, the effect becomes nega-
tive. Such a reversal of the relationship could signal the fact that as too much human
capital is devoted to human capital production, there is less and less of it available
for market goods production.
 5. Exploring the Effect of Public Expenditure Composition
In this section the model is calibrated for different expenditure structures and the ef-
fects of changes in the composition of public investment expenditure are explored for
the three country groups. As above, the classification in low-, lower-middle- and
upper-middle-income countries is retained25. Here, again, only the results of the low-
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25 See appendix A.4 for the complete list of countries.
EFFECT OF u1 ON b/y (Low Income Group) EFFECT OF u1 ON y (Low Income Group)
EFFECT OF u1 ON U (Low Income Group) EFFECT OF (1-u1) ON h (Low Income Group)
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income groups are reported. For the results of the other two country groups, see 
Appendix A.6. The data on public expenditure is obtained from the IMF's Government
Finance Statistics. Since these are too detailed for our analysis, the different expendi-
ture categories are summarized to match the following model parameters: public in-
vestment in infrastructure, α1v1, education, α1v2, and health, α1v3, public transfers,
α2, public consumption, α3 and debt services, α4 =(1–α1–α2–α3)26. Note that the val-
ues reflect the averages for all countries of one category.
By plugging the obtained numerical values (α1= 0.4035 , α2= 0.0623 , α3= 0.4342) into
the model, setting r= 0.03, dk= 0.075, dh= 0.075, dg= 0.05, α = β =γ = 0.33, u1= 0.85,
ε1= ε2= 0.2, ε3 = 0.25, r = 0.08, h = 0.1 and using the values for A and i fp that were
found in the previous section (A = 1 , n = 0.0195  i fp = 3.361), one can simulate the ef-
fect of changes in the composition of public expenditure on the stationary states by
letting v1 , v2 and v3 vary
27. 
In the following this is done for the low-income country group28. Although all graphs
are presented in the 3-dimensional space such that the interaction of all three invest-
ment expenditure parameters can be observed at the same time, the stationary states
for shifts from public investment in health, α1v2, to public investment in education,
α1v3, are of particular interest29. 
Generally, the results suggest that, in order to maximize the growth of per capita in-
come, more than half of public investment expenditure should be on infrastructure
while the residual should be roughly equally allocated to investments that support pro-
duction of human capital. Figures 4 to 12, all of which are hump-shaped, depict the
effects of changes in the investment expenditure composition on the various model
parameters. Figures 4 to 9 show all possible investment expenditure compositions for
income, y , capital, k, public capital, g, public debt, b, consumption, c and total public
resource absorption, ep , are qualitatively the same. Only the graphs for human capital,
h, utility, U, and debt/income ratio, b/y, differ in their behavior. In Figure 12 one can
see that human capital can be increased beyond its welfare- and growth-maximizing
level by setting v2=0.30 and v3=0.20 (and v1=0.5). At this point the maximal h is reached,
however, the benefits of its increase do not offset the costs of higher 
depreciation. Figure 10 depicts the changes in utility over the range of v1, v2 and v3.
Whilst the curvature of U is less pronounced than in the previous graphs, it is 
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26 See appendix A.3 for details.
27 Note that described the numerical values for r, dk, dh, dg, α, β, γ, u, ε1, ε2, ε3, α1, α2, α3 and h remain the same for the 
remainder of this section.
28 Similar results hold for the other two groups. Complete sets of graphs for the other groups are listed in Appendix A.6.
29 Note that v1+ v2+ v3= 1. always has to hold which restricts the plane to a triangular space. By fixing v2 or v3 the effects of  
changes in v1 are also always observable.
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hump-shaped and possesses an interior maximum which lies at general maximum, 
i.e. v1=0.65 , v2=0.15 and v3=0.20. The shape of the debt to income ratio, b/y, differs
completely from the other variables as it does not possess an interior maximum. As
one can see in graph 11, the curvature of b/y is strictly concave and attains its maxi-
mum value at the origin, i.e. v2 =v3=0 (and v1=1). The fact that is, however, more inter-
esting is that the ratio is approximately stable through most of the range of v2 and v3. 
Sustainability problems due to shifts in the investment expenditure composition do
not occur in the long run. The aim of this section was to conduct a comparative static
exercise for changes in the composition of public investment expenditure. The results
show that in the long run the welfare and growth maximum lies at a composition of
roughly v1=0.65, v2=0.15 and v3=0.20. Debt sustainability problems did not occur
throughout the possible range of v1, v2 and v3. Yet, overall to the issue of debt sus-
tainability we have presumed here a very passive debt policy as indicated in equation
(5), which assumes that new debt is not issued and the repayment follows a fixed
rule, namely epα4. If we allow for new debt issue, as discussed in section 3.1, the debt
to output ratio, b/y is likely to increase.
 Figure 4.  Figure 5.
Effects of Changes on Income y Effects of Changes on Capital k
 Figure 6.  Figure 7.
Effects of Changes on Public Debt b Effects of Changes on Public Capital g
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 Figure 8.  Figure 9.
Effects of Changes on Consumption c Effects of Changes on Public Absorption ep
 Figure 10. Effects of Changes on  Figure 11.
Debt to Income Ratio b/y Effects of Changes on Utility U
 Figure 12. Effects of Changes on Human Capital h
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 6. Testing Debt Sustainability36
In section 3.2 we modeled the inter-temporal budget constraint in the context of our
model but we did not pursue this question further in our calibration studies in section
4 and 5. If one studies particular countries (or country groups) from a time series
perspective, it is an important empirical question whether certain public policies for
growth stay within the bounds of a sustainable fiscal policy. Here we briefly discuss
tests for sustainability of fiscal policies and suggest a version that has been tested for
advanced countries. We will then suggest sustainability tests that can be undertaken
for specific country studies31.
If one studies the effect of fiscal policy on economic growth, one needs to check, as in-
dicated in section 3.2, whether the government fulfills the inter-temporal budget con-
straint. As shown in section 3.2, in economic terms, this constraint states that public
(net) debt at time zero must equal the expected present value of future present-value 
primary surpluses. In general terms, this requirement is also often referred to as the 
no-Ponzi game condition. In a general form we can write this as follows. Neglecting 
stochastic effects and assuming that the interest rate is constant, the intertemporal
budget constraint can be written as 
B(0) = ∫∞0 e–rτSp(τ )dτ , (19) 
with r the constant interest rate, B(0) public debt at time zero and Sp the primary
surplus32.
Equivalent to equation (19) is the following equation 
lim e–rt B(t )= 0, (20)
with B(t) public debt at time t, stating that the present value of public debt converges
to Zero for t →∞.
In the economic literature numerous studies exist which explore whether (19) and
(20) hold in real economies33. For example, Hamilton and Flavin (1984) suggest test-
ing for the presence of a bubble term in the time series of public net debt which would
indicate that a given fiscal policy is not sustainable. Trehan and Walsh (1991) pro-
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31 For a detailed discussion of sustainability tests see Greiner et al. (2005).
32 For further derivations see e.g. Blanchard and Fischer (1989), ch. 2.
33 See e.g. Hamilton and Flavin (1984), Kremers (1988), Wilcox (1989), and Trehan and Walsh (1991).
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t→∞
posed to test whether the budget deficit is stationary or to test whether the primary
budget deficit and the public debt series are co-integrated and (1−λL)Spt is stationary,
with 0 ≤ λ<1+rt. Another test, proposed by Wilcox (1989), is to test whether the series
of undiscounted debt displays an unconditional mean of zero. If this holds the inter-
temporal government constraint will be fulfilled, because the inter-temporal budget
constraint requires the discounted debt to converge to zero34. This implies that all
government debt will be repaid at some point in time. 
Moreover, another aspect of these tests which has given rise to criticism is that those
tests need strong assumptions, because the transversality condition involves an ex-
pectation about states in the future that are difficult to obtain from a single set of
time series data and because assumptions about the discount rate have to be made35.
Alternative tests check solely if in the long run some debt-to-income ratio remains sta-
tionary. A test procedure which circumvents the problems associated with the above
first type of test focuses on the time series of the debt ratio, i.e. on the ratio of public
debt-to-GDP. If this series is constant the inter-temporal budget constraint is fulfilled
for dynamically efficient economies. To see this let B/Y = c1 be the constant debt ratio,
with Y denoting GDP and c1 a positive constant. Inserting B/Y = c1 in (20) yields 
lim c1Y0 e(γ–r)t = 0, (21)
for γ < r, with γ >0 the constant growth rate of GDP. The condition γ < r characterizes
a dynamically efficient economy and is likely to hold in real economies. For example,
in EU countries this seems to be obvious if one compares interest rates with GDP
growth rates. But even the US, where growth rates have exceeded interest rates on
safe government bonds since the 1990s, is a dynamically efficient economy36. There-
fore, for advanced countries we may limit our considerations to the case of dynamic
efficient economies and assume that the discount rate of government debt exceeds
the GDP growth rate37. For developing countries, like the low- and lower-middle in-
come countries of this study, this would have to be explored. 
However, testing for stationarity of the debt-to-GDP ratio is characterized by some
shortcomings, too. It is difficult to distinguish between a time series which is stationary
about a positive intercept and one that shows a trend. This holds because standard
unit root regressions have low power against autoregressive alternatives if the AR co-
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t→∞
efficient is close to one. As a consequence, the hypothesis that a given fiscal policy is
sustainable has been rejected too easily.  
Therefore, Bohn (1998) suggests to test whether the primary deficit-to-GDP ratio is
a positive linear function of the debt-to-GDP ratio. If this holds, a given fiscal policy
will be sustainable. As discussed in section 3.2 the intuitive reasoning behind this ar-
gument is that if a government raises the primary surplus as the public debt ratio
rises, it takes a corrective action which stabilizes the debt ratio and makes public debt
sustainable. Before one can undertake empirical tests which apply this concept we
need to advance some theoretical considerations about the relevance of this test. We
limit our considerations to deterministic economies. 
Assuming, as in section 3.2, that the primary surplus to GDP ratio depends on a con-
stant and linearly on the debt-to-GDP ratio, this variable can be written as
Sp(t) = T(t)–G(t) = α+β (B(t)), (22)Y(t)          Y(t)                   Y(t)
with T(t ) tax revenue at t, G(t ) public spending at t, α and β are constants which can
be negative or positive. α is a systematic component which determines how the level
of the primary deficit reacts to variations in GDP. α can also be interpreted as other
(constant) economic variables which affect the surplus ratio. The coefficient β can
be called a reaction coefficient since it gives the response of the primary surplus ratio
to an increase in the debt ratio. Inserting (22) in the differential equation, giving the
evolution of public debt, the latter equation is then given by 
B(t )=rB(t )+G(t )−T(t )= (r −β )B(t )−αY(t ). (23) 
Solving this equation we get
α
B(t )= (r –γ –β)Y(0)eγt+e(r–β)C1. (24) 
with B(0) > 0 debt at time t = 0 which is assumed to be strictly positive and with C1 a con-
stant given by C1= B(0)–Y(0)α/(r −γ −β). Multiplying both sides of (24) by e–rt leads to 
α
e–rtB(t )=(r –γ –β)Y(0)e(γ–r)t+e–βtC1. (25) 
The first term on the right hand side in (25) converges to zero in dynamically efficient
economies and the second term converges for β > 0 and diverges for β < 0. These con-
siderations show that β > 0 guarantees that the inter-temporal budget constraint of
the government holds.fis
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.
Further, with equation (22) the debt-to-GDP ratio evolves according to
B    Yb=b(B – Y )=b(r–β–γ)–α. (26)
Solving this differential equation, we obtain the debt-to-GDP ratio b as
b(t)=(r –γ –β)+e(r–γ–β)t C2, (27)
where C2 is a constant given by C2=b(0)–α/(r−β −γ ), with b(0)≡B(0)/Y(0) the debt-
GDP ratio at time t = 0.
Equation (27) shows that the debt-to-GDP ratio remains bounded if r−γ −β < 0 holds.
This shows that a positive β does not assure boundedness of the debt-GDP ratio al-
though the intertemporal budget constraint of the government is fulfilled in this case.
Only if β is larger than the difference between the interest rate and the GDP growth
rate the debt ratio remains bounded. These considerations demonstrate that sustain-
ability of debt may be given even if the debt-to-GDP ratio rises over time - a situation
which seems to hold for some countries.
But it must also be pointed out that for too high a level of public debt the government
will probably not be able to raise the primary surplus any further. Then, our rule for-
mulated in equation (27) will break down. This holds because, the present value of
future surpluses must equal public debt at any finite point in time. So, if the govern-
ment is not able to raise the primary surplus as public debt rises any longer from a
certain point of time, say t1, onwards, β is zero or even negative. Then, a fiscal policy
is sustainable only if the government has succeeded to reduce public debt to zero up
to that point of time t1. This implies that in the long-run the debt-to-GDP ratio must
be constant, although it may well rise transitorily. However, it is ultimately an empir-
ical question what the country specific β will be38.
In this section therefore we suggest some method related to the Bohn method (Bohn,
1998) which allows one to estimate sustainability, but at the same time works, as
section 3.2 has indicated, with a time varying reaction of governments to the debt to
GDP ratio. This allows one to get some insight using empirical tests about the sus-
tainability of policies. As we have pointed out in section 3.2 our strategy for testing
the sustainability of debt has the advantage that the test does not depend on the in-
terest rate which is used to discount public debt as needed in the first type of the
above discussed tests.
fiscal Po
licy, Public expenditure c
o
m
po
sitio
n and G
ro
w
th. sem
m
ler, W
. , G
reiner, a
., D
iallo
, b
., r
ajaram
, a
. and r
ezai, a
. 
71
38 This could be estimated separately for each country in country studies.
 
  
A E S T I M AT I O
  
.
α
. .
Following our setup in section 3.2, the equation suggested to be tested is as follows:
s yt =βt byt +αTZt+εt , (28) 
where s yt and b yt are the primary surplus to GDP and the debt-to-GDP ratio, respec-
tively. Zt is a vector which consists of the number 1 and of other factors related to
the primary surplus and εt is an error term which is i.i.d. N(0,σ 2).
The idea behind estimating (28) is the tax smoothing hypothesis according to which
public deficits should be used to finance transitory government spending, for example
higher public spending during recessions. Further, the variables contained in Zt may
differ depending on which country is analyzed. In the US, for example, military spend-
ing is a variable which exerts a strong influence on the primary surplus. In European
countries social spending plays an important role affecting the primary surplus. For
other countries, for example, low-income countries, other spending categories may
be relevant. 
We want to note, as concerns the primary surplus, one has to distinguish between
the primary surplus including the social surplus and the primary surplus exclusive of
the social surplus, where social surplus means the surplus of social insurance system.
This holds because in some countries deficits of the social insurance system raise the
stock of public debt, since the government sector and the social insurance system are
not separated, whereas this does not hold for other countries. So, in some European
countries the social insurance systems are autonomous and do not borrow in capital
markets. For example, if the social insurance system runs deficits, these deficits are
either transitory because they must be paid back in the next period or the deficits are
covered by reserves from earlier years. 
If, on the other hand, the social insurance system has a surplus this does not raise
the surplus of the government, but is used as reserve. However, it happens that the
government subsidizes the social insurance which leads to a decline in the surplus of
the government. This amount, however, is included in the regular surplus or deficit
of the government so that taking it into account in the surplus or deficit of the gov-
ernment and adding that of the social insurance would lead to double counting. 
These considerations demonstrate that institutional regulations determine which con-
cept for the primary surplus should be used. As we noted above, social security and
transfer arrangements in countries of different income groups seem to be different.
Our suggested test should therefore be adjusted to each type of income group - or
country if country specific fiscal policy studies are undertaken.
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 7. Conclusion
The World Bank has argued in two recent policy papers that fiscal policy design should
seek to ensure macroeconomic stability as well as promote growth and the long-run
welfare of a country. The growth impact of the composition of public expenditure is an
important aspect of the design of fiscal policy that is consequently the focus of research
interest. In this paper we suggest a general model of fiscal policy and growth in an econ-
omy with a government that taxes optimally and undertakes public expenditure on (a)
education and health facilities, (b) public infrastructure such as roads and bridges, (c)
public administration, (d) transfers and public consumption facilities, and (e) debt serv-
ice. We use this model to explore the impact of shifts in the composition of expenditure
on long-run per capita income and other macroeconomic variables. We also set up the
model in a way that allows us to study whether fiscal policy is sustainable. This model
is solved, the impact of foreign aid, the allocation of human and public capital and fiscal
expenditure on per capita income and other macro variables explored. 
Foreign aid per capita and the productivity factor both have a positive and linear effect
on per capita GDP and welfare. Such a result is clearly what would have been predicted
by the theory as inflows of foreign aid are assumed to be used for investment in roads,
schools, hospitals, or any other infrastructure that plays an important role in raising
productivity. Foreign aid has either no effect, or a slightly negative effect, on the stock
of resources absorbed by the public sector. Such a result could be due to some “crowd-
ing-in” effect, reflecting the fact that as foreign aid flows in, more investment and pro-
duction opportunities open up and resources are used more privately and less publicly. 
Second, the model suggests that the choice of allocating human capital to market pro-
duction or to human capital production poses an important trade-off. As the share of
human capital that is devoted to human capital production rises (starting from a very
low share) income, as well as welfare, initially rises but then falls. In addition, beyond
a certain point, the ability to expand the stock of human capital itself is actually dimin-
ished. Thus, there exists a growth-maximizing allocation of human capital between final
production and the creation of additional human capital. Overall, our model suggests
that the larger fraction of human capital should be used for market production39.
The calibration exercise was also undertaken for different compositions of public in-
vestment expenditure for the three country groups. The results of this exercise show
that the composition of public investment expenditure matters, as the gains of moving
to the optimal allocation between public infrastructure, and education and health
facilities are significant. Based on the model and the calibration exercise, a practical
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rule of thumb seems to be that about two-thirds of public investment should be di-
rected towards public infrastructure that facilitates market production. The remaining
third should be split more or less evenly between public investments in facilities that
support the provision of health and education. Such a division of resources would
maximize (per capita) income and welfare. This is due to the fact that the facilitation
of market good production directly increases the availability of public resources, while
the other two expenditure categories first have to permeate the economic system be-
fore affecting the availability of public resources and thus growth and utility. This re-
sult has relevance for policy debate on the composition of expenditure necessary to
achieve the Millenium Development Goals (MDGs), which include an income target
(halve the number of people below the poverty line) as well as specific targets related
to the achievement of health status and access to educational services. The stylized
model in this paper suggests that greater emphasis on the health and educational
targets relative to investments that may contribute to expansion of market production
may result in slower progress on reducing poverty. 
During this numerical exercise, attention was also paid to the evolution of public debt.
Quite surprisingly, the debt-to-income ratio was almost invariant to all possible in-
vestment expenditure compositions. In the considered case the ratio stabilized below
70%. Here the rule of thumb seems to emerge that in the long run debt sustainability
does not pose a problem as long as resources for public investments are used in a
growth-maximizing way.
We conclude with some observations regarding possible extensions of the model de-
scribed in this paper. One possibility (described in the appendix) is to estimate the model
using time series methods. However, this will only be possible for countries where high-
quality time series data are available. An important extension of the model would be to
develop the revenue side of fiscal policy in order to study the effects of various forms of
taxation on per capita income. Another extension would be to consider the growth im-
plications of variations in the balance between recurrent and capital expenditure by al-
lowing government employment of teachers and doctors. Finally, the debt sustainability
tests proposed in this paper could be applied to country-specific studies.
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 Appendix
The appendix begins with the out-of-steady-state solution for a simplified version of
the model (A.1) and a suggestion of how to estimate the simpler model using time
series analysis (A.2).
Appendix A.3 explains how the data used in the calibration was constructed and ap-
pendix A.4 lists the countries used. Appendix A.5 lists the data used to compute the
graphs shown in section 4 and additional data on the two other country groups which
have not been discussed in the paper.
Appendix A.6 does the same with graphs on the long run effects of public expenditure
composition that have been omitted in the main part of the paper.
A.1 Out-of-Steady-State Solutions
Since economies are rarely at their steady states, it is, for practical purposes, of great
importance to explore what decisions should be taken out of the steady state. There
is, however, no analytical solution for our decision variables out of the steady 
state. Yet, once the parameters have been set and the stationary state of the variables 
{c, e, k, h, g, λ1, λ2, λ3} p have been computed, the dynamic programming algorithm
developed by Gruene and Semmler (2004) can be used to study the out-of-steady-
state dynamics not only of consumption, c, and the use of resources by the public, ep ,
but also the state variables: physical capital stock, human capital and public capital
stock40. Using our parameter set above, next we will compute the out-of-steady-state
solutions using a numerical algorithm. This way we can study the following: When, for
example, the capital stock of a country is k<k* (and h < h*, g < g*) the dynamic pro-
gramming solution allows one to judge whether c should be high or low, how ep be-
haves, and how the control variables relate to each other out of the steady state. 
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Using the algorithm of Gruene and Semmler (2004) we have solved the model (1)-
(4), with u1 fixed, and thus solely with c and ep as control variables and k, h and g as
state variables41. Yet, since the value function (1) is a function of the decision variables
c and ep and the state variables k, h and g (the former again depending on k, h and g)
one can only obtain proper graphs by appropriate projections and study the value
function and behavior of decision variables in a two-dimensional subspace.
We have solved the model (1)-(4) in the vicinity of the steady state k*= 65.47, h* =18.16,
g*=11.47 which was obtained by solving the equation system arising from the Hamil-
tonian in section 3.142. Next, in the vicinity of the positive steady state we have taken a
cube [60,70]×[16,20]×[9,13] for k, u and g, with a subspace for the choice variables
[7,8]×[7,8], for c and ep .
Figure 13 shows four sample trajectories in a three dimensional space, with initial
conditions for trajectory 1 (T1): (66.2, 18.9, 11.8) which are above the steady state
k*, h*, g*. Trajectory 2 (T2) has initial conditions: (67.5, 18.7, 11.4) and is, thus, far
to the right of the steady state k*, h*, g*. Trajectory 3 (T3): (63.2, 16.8, 11.1) starts
below the steady state k*, h*, g*. Finally, Trajectory 4 (T4) starts with k= 68.2 above,
with h= 16.5 below and with g at the steady state.
As one can observe in Figure 13, the correctly taken optimal decisions c and ep make
the initial states of state variables converging toward the steady state k*, h*, g*for all
four sample trajectories. Note that trajectories (T1), (T2), (T3) and (T4) do not only
exhibit some irregular features but also cross each other. This comes from the fact
that we follow the trajectories in a 2-dim subspace state variables only, namely in the
k−h space. For graphical purposes, the third state variable g is fixed in Figure 13.
If one stores the decision variables c and ep at each grid point of the 3-dim cube of k,
h and g one can then plot them in a 3-dim space where the height represents the nu-
merical value of the decision variable. In Figure 14, for example, the height stands for
the value of c, and the other two axes represent k and h.
In Figure 14 it is clearly visible that if k>k* and h>h* the optimal consumption c is re-
quired to be high, above its steady state. The reverse holds for the space k<k* and 
h<h*. Here c has to be below its steady state. This behavior of the optimal c is a result
that one would also expect from economic intuition.
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 Figure 13.Out of Steady State Dynamics
 Figure 14. Decision Variable c in the k−h space
On the other hand as Figure 15 shows the decision variable ep is not so monotonically
dependent on k and h. In some regions ep is higher than in others. Note that we have
neglected here to study the behavior of c depending on government capital, g. This
also can be easily done, but this might not be so relevant in the context of our study.
Next, we want to study the dependence of the total use of public resources, ep , on
private capital, k, and public capital, g. 
Figure 16 shows how the decision variable ep behaves in the k−g space. We can observe
that ep will be high above the steady state, for g<g*, and low below the steady state, for
g < g*. The decision variable ep does not seem to depend much on the level of the capital
stock, k. Finally, we want to make a comment on the constraints that we have put on
the control variables, c and ep . For both the lower constraint is 7 and the upper is 8 so
that all optimal c and ep are staying within those constraints. But note that with c*= 7.04
and*=7.53 ep the decision variables are above the lower constraints of 7. Putting such
constraints on the decision variables just means that the decision variables cannot 
go fast enough down and thus the state variables that are affected by this are not 
going up fast enough. This is the reason why the trajectory (T4) in Figure 13
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Figure 15. Decision Variable ep in the k−h space
 Figure 16. Decision Variable ep in the k−g space
first moves far down (to the left) in the state variable k and then rises again moving
toward its steady-state value. The above exercise with constraints for the decision
variables is nevertheless of great importance for practical economic policy. It basically
means that the decision variables do not have to be exactly at their optimal values in
order to exhibit convergence dynamics. For actual economies an exact optimal control
is indeed hard to achieve, since for actual economies, there is model uncertainty –
which model fits the economy – as well as data uncertainty (see Brock et al., 2003).
Our computations with constraints for the decision variables then means that the de-
cision variables need to be only above or below their steady-state values in the ap-
propriate state space in order to fulfill the requirement to be roughly optimal. This
aspect appears to us of great practical importance, since decisions for c and ep have
to be only approximately correct.
A.2 The Estimable Form of the Model
Next we want to spell out some implications of how to estimate our model with time
series methods. Even for our simplified social planner model of eqns. (1) to (4) it could
be too ambitious to estimate the model employing Euler equations, derived from thefis
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first order conditions for the two control variables for consumption, c, and total use of
resources, ep , and the decision variable u1. As the model is written, it gives us the out-
come of the social optimum. We propose to reduce the model further, and treat, for
the purpose of a time series estimation, only consumption as decision variable. The
other choice variables, ep and u1 are just treated as historical variables, as time series
observations. This is also likely to inject some realistic features into the model. For a
time series study we thus propose to include only one Euler equation in the time series
estimation procedure. We suggest to only use the equations (2)-(4) and the equation
for c., which can be derived from the first order condition of the decision variable c as
→c
.=c(Aαk α−1 (u1h) β (v1g )γ −r −dk ) (29)c λ1
The model reflects now the fact that it is only optimized with respect to private con-
sumption. The decision making process for all the public variables might be considered
too complex to be presumed as the result of some optimization process. Yet, in the nor-
mative sense, as we discuss below, we still might consider the other public decision vari-
ables as choice variables so as to give us a guidance to welfare improving policies. Above,
we have undertaken some calibration and comparative static study in order to explore
the impact of fiscal policy decisions on per capita income and welfare.
A.3 Data
Two different sources were used for gathering the data necessary for the calibration
and comparative static exercises. First, information on GDP, population size and for-
eign aid flows was taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators
(WDI). Second, information on the public expenditure composition was taken from
the Government Finance Statistics (GFS). In order to make the data compatible with
the model, only category 7 (and its subcategories) of the GFS were used. Public in-
frastructure investment, v1α1ep , consists of “Economic affairs” (704), “Environmental
protection” (705) and “Housing and community amenities” (706). Public expenditure
on health, v2α1ep , was taken from “Health” (707). Public expenditure on education,
v3α1ep , consists of “Education” (709). “Recreation, culture, and religion” (708) and
“Social protection” (710) was subsumed under public transfers, α2ep . Public con-
sumption and debt payments, α3 ep and α4 ep , were defined as the sum of “General
public services” (701), “Defense” (702) and “Public order and safety” (703). Since
the information on debt service is very spotty, we chose α4 = 0.10 in a rough approx-
imation and set the accordingly decreased above sum equal to α3. 
We follow the IMF Development Committee (2006) in its classification of countries
in low, lower-middle and upper-middle income countries. However, due to the bad
quality of the data in the GFS, we dropped some countries and reduced the list of
countries to the ones listed in appendix A.4.
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c. = – λ1
.
A.4 Country Groups
 Table 3. Reduced List of Countries
Low-Income Lower-Middle Income Upper-Middle Income
Bhutan Belarus Argentina
Burundi Bolivia Croatia
Ethiopia Bulgaria Czech Republic
India Dominican Republic Estonia
Moldova Egypt Hungary
Myanmar El Salvador Lithuania
Pakistan Iran Mauritius
Yemen Jamaica Mongolia
Zambia Maldives Panama
Morocco Poland
Philippines Uruguay
Romania
Sri Lanka
Thailand
Tunisia
A.5 Appendix to Section 4
 Table 4. Effect of Foreign Aid, i fp , on the Steady-State Variables 
(Low-Income Group)
i fp ep c k h g b y U
2.0 1539.3 890.4 10848 1152.6 9005 2531.8 3451.6 89.70
2.2 1539.1 891.0 10850 1152.8 9006 2531.5 3452.2 89.71
2.4 1538.9 891.6 10851 1152.9 9008 2531.2 3452.7 89.72
2.6 1538.8 892.1 10853 1153.0 9010 2530.8 3453.2 89.73
2.8 1538.6 892.7 10855 1153.2 9012 2530.5 3453.8 89.73
3.0 1538.4 893.2 10856 1153.3 9014 2530.2 3454.3 89.74
3.2 1538.2 893.8 10858 1153.4 9015 2529.9 3454.8 89.75
3.4 1538.0 894.4 10860 1153.6 9017 2529.6 3455.4 89.76
3.6 1537.8 894.9 10861 1153.7 9019 2529.3 3455.9 89.80
3.8 1537.6 895.5 10863 1153.8 9021 2529.0 3456.4 89.77
4.0 1537.5 896.0 10865 1153.9 9023 2528.7 3457.0 89.78
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 Table 5. Effect of the Productivity Factor, A, on the Steady-State Variables
(Low-Income Group)
A ep c k h g b y U
1.000 1538 894 10859 1153 9016 2530 3455 89.8
1.005 1589 923 11214 1175 9311 2613 3568 90.2
1.010 1641 953 11580 1196 9614 2699 3684 90.6
1.015 1694 984 11955 1218 9926 2786 3804 91.1
1.020 1749 1015 12341 1240 10246 2877 3927 91.5
1.025 1805 1048 12737 1262 10575 2969 4053 91.9
1.030 1863 1081 13144 1284 10913 3065 4182 92.3
1.035 1923 1115 13562 1307 11259 3163 4315 92.8
1.040 1984 1150 13992 1330 11615 3263 4452 93.2
1.045 2047 1186 14432 1354 11981 3366 4592 93.6
1.050 2111 1223 14885 1377 12356 3472 4736 94.0
1.055 2177 1261 15349 1401 12742 3581 4884 94.4
1.060 2245 1300 15825 1425 13137 3692 5035 94.9
 Table 6. Effect of the Fraction of Human Capital Used in Market Goods 
Production, u1, on the Steady-State Variables (Low-Income Group)
u1 ep c k h g b y U
0.05 9 15 104 144 98 14 33 32.4
0.10 39 33 321 253 274 64 102 44.4
0.15 93 64 700 383 588 152 223 53.7
0.20 168 107 1230 517 1028 276 391 60.8
0.25 263 162 1899 648 1582 433 604 66.4
0.30 376 227 2691 774 2239 618 856 71.0
0.35 503 300 3586 893 2982 828 1141 74.9
0.40 642 380 4563 1002 3793 1056 1452 78.1
0.45 789 464 5597 1100 4650 1298 1781 80.8
0.50 940 551 6657 1184 5530 1547 2118 83.1
0.55 1090 637 7710 1252 6404 1793 2453 85.1
0.60 1233 719 8716 1303 7239 2028 2773 86.8
0.65 1363 793 9628 1332 7995 2242 3063 88.1
0.70 1471 855 10386 1338 8624 2419 3305 89.2
0.75 1547 899 10918 1315 9065 2544 3474 89.8
0.80 1576 916 11123 1256 9236 2592 3539 90.1
0.85 1538 894 10859 1153 9016 2530 3455 89.8
0.90 1399 814 9882 989 8206 2301 3144 88.5
0.95 1084 633 7665 721 6366 1782 2439 85.0
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 Table 7. Effects of Foreign Aid, i fp , on Steady-State Variables 
(Lower-Middle-Income Group)
i fp ep c k h g b y U
3.00 5824.8 4659.7 45470 2742.7 42050 8642.2 14467.8 104.38
3.20 5824.7 4660.3 45472 2742.8 42052 8642.0 14468.4 104.38
3.40 5824.6 4660.9 45474 2742.9 42055 8641.8 14469.0 104.38
3.60 5824.5 4661.4 45476 2743.0 42057 8641.6 14469.6 104.38
3.80 5824.3 4662.0 45478 2743.0 42059 8641.4 14470.2 104.38
4.00 5824.2 4662.6 45480 2743.1 42061 8641.3 14470.8 104.38
4.20 5824.1 4663.1 45481 2743.2 42064 8641.1 14471.4 104.38
4.40 5823.9 4663.7 45483 2743.3 42066 8640.9 14472.0 104.38
4.60 5823.8 4664.3 45485 2743.4 42068 8640.7 14472.6 104.40
4.80 5823.7 4664.8 45487 2743.5 42071 8640.5 14473.2 104.39
5.00 5823.6 4665.4 45489 2743.5 42073 8640.3 14473.8 104.39
 Table 8. Effects of the Productivity Factor, A, on the Steady-State Variables
(Lower-Middle-Income Group)
A ep c k h g b y U
1.180 5824 4663 45481 2743 42063 8641 14471 104.4
1.185 5986 4792 46742 2786 43229 8881 14873 104.7
1.190 6152 4924 48034 2829 44423 9127 15283 105.1
1.195 6321 5059 49355 2872 45645 9378 15704 105.4
1.200 6494 5198 50707 2916 46895 9636 16134 105.7
1.205 6672 5339 52091 2961 48174 9899 16574 106.1
1.210 6853 5484 53506 3006 49483 10168 17025 106.4
1.215 7039 5632 54953 3051 50821 10443 17485 106.8
1.220 7229 5784 56434 3097 52190 10725 17956 107.1
1.225 7423 5939 57948 3144 53590 11013 18438 107.4
1.230 7621 6097 59496 3191 55021 11308 18931 107.8
1.235 7824 6259 61079 3238 56485 11609 19434 108.1
1.240 8032 6425 62698 3286 57982 11917 19949 108.4
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 Table 9. Effect of u1, the Fraction of Human Capital Used in Market Goods
Production, on the Steady-State Variables (Lower-Middle-Income Group)
u1 ep c k h g b y U
0.05 35 41 328 278 316 52 104 44.3
0.10 154 137 1260 574 1176 229 401 59.8
0.15 359 300 2856 894 2651 532 909 69.8
0.20 644 528 5082 1217 4710 956 1617 76.9
0.25 1004 815 7889 1532 7305 1490 2510 82.4
0.30 1430 1155 11211 1835 10376 2122 3567 86.8
0.35 1912 1540 14968 2119 13850 2836 4763 90.4
0.40 2437 1959 19068 2380 17641 3616 6067 93.5
0.45 2993 2403 23404 2613 21651 4441 7447 96.0
0.50 3564 2859 27853 2813 25764 5288 8862 98.2
0.55 4130 3311 32272 2977 29849 6128 10268 100.1
0.60 4672 3743 36492 3097 33752 6931 11611 101.6
0.65 5162 4134 40316 3168 37287 7659 12828 102.9
0.70 5570 4460 43498 3181 40229 8264 13840 103.8
0.75 5856 4688 45728 3126 42292 8688 14550 104.5
0.80 5967 4777 46591 2988 43089 8852 14824 104.7
0.85 5824 4663 45481 2743 42063 8641 14471 104.4
0.90 5299 4243 41383 2351 38274 7862 13167 103.2
0.95 4106 3291 32082 1713 29674 6092 10208 100.0
 Table 10. Effects of Foreign Aid, i fp , on Steady-State Variables 
(Upper-Middle-Income Group)
i fp ep c k h g b y U
3.0 10068.2 11326.4 89637 3597.5 68113 13335.4 28520.8 106.26
3.2 10068.1 11327.3 89640 3597.6 68116 13335.3 28521.8 106.26
3.4 10068.1 11328.1 89643 3597.7 68119 13335.2 28522.8 106.27
3.6 10068.0 11328.9 89646 3597.8 68122 13335.1 28523.8 106.27
3.8 10067.9 11329.8 89649 3597.9 68125 13334.9 28524.8 106.27
4.0 10067.8 11330.6 89652 3598.0 68128 13334.8 28525.8 106.27
4.2 10067.7 11331.4 89656 3598.0 68131 13334.7 28526.8 106.27
4.4 10067.6 11332.3 89659 3598.1 68134 13334.6 28527.7 106.27
4.6 10067.5 11333.1 89662 3598.2 68137 13334.5 28528.7 106.30
4.8 10067.4 11333.9 89665 3598.3 68140 13334.4 28529.7 106.27
5.0 10067.4 11334.8 89668 3598.4 68143 13334.3 28530.7 106.27
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 Table 11. Effects of the Productivity Factor, A, on the Steady-State Variables
(Upper-Middle-Income Group)
A ep c k h g b y U
1.450 10068 11331 89654 3598 68130 13335 28526 106.3
1.455 10295 11586 91674 3643 69664 13636 29169 106.5
1.460 10526 11846 93733 3689 71228 13942 29824 106.8
1.465 10762 12111 95830 3735 72822 14254 30491 107.0
1.470 11002 12381 97967 3782 74446 14572 31171 107.3
1.475 11247 12656 100145 3829 76100 14897 31864 107.5
1.480 11496 12936 102363 3876 77785 15227 32570 107.8
1.485 11750 13221 104622 3924 79502 15563 33289 108.0
1.490 12009 13512 106924 3973 81251 15906 34021 108.3
1.495 12272 13808 109268 4021 83032 16255 34767 108.5
1.500 12541 14110 111656 4071 84846 16610 35527 108.8
1.505 12814 14417 114088 4120 86693 16972 36301 109.0
1.510 13092 14729 116564 4170 88574 17341 37089 109.3
 Table 12. Effect of u1, the Fraction of Human Capital Used in Market Goods
Production, on the Steady-State Variables (Upper-Middle-Income Group)
u1 ep c k h g b y U
0.05 62 87 623 355 488 82 198 49.9
0.10 269 319 2465 749 1886 356 784 65.1
0.15 623 717 5610 1170 4276 825 1785 74.4
0.20 1116 1271 10000 1594 7611 1478 3182 81.1
0.25 1738 1970 15534 2008 11815 2302 4943 86.1
0.30 2474 2797 22083 2405 16791 3277 7027 90.1
0.35 3307 3732 29491 2778 22419 4380 9383 93.5
0.40 4215 4753 37575 3120 28561 5583 11956 96.3
0.45 5176 5833 46124 3426 35056 6856 14676 98.6
0.50 6162 6940 54894 3690 41719 8161 17466 100.6
0.55 7141 8041 63606 3904 48338 9458 20238 102.3
0.60 8076 9091 71927 4062 54660 10697 22886 103.7
0.65 8923 10043 79465 4155 60387 11819 25284 104.9
0.70 9629 10836 85739 4173 65153 12753 27280 105.8
0.75 10123 11391 90136 4100 68494 13408 28680 106.3
0.80 10314 11606 91837 3919 69787 13661 29221 106.5
0.85 10068 11329 89648 3598 68123 13335 28524 106.3
0.90 9160 10309 81569 3083 61985 12132 25954 105.2
0.95 7099 7993 63232 2246 48054 9402 20119 102.2
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A.6 Appendix to Section 5
Since the calibration exercise for the composition of public expenditure involves too
many parameters to list all data in tables, the depiction of the lower-middle- and
upper-middle-income cases is limited to graphs. As one can see, these graphs show
the same qualitative effects as the low-income group's that were discussed in the main
part of the paper.
 Figure 17. Effects of Expenditure Composition Changes on 
the per capita Parameters in the Lower-Middle-Income Case
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 Figure 18. Effects of Expenditure Composition Changes on 
the per capita Parameters in the Upper-Middle-Income Case
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